The Seventeen-Point Agreement

In September 1950, a Tibetan mission to Delhi met with the Chinese ambassador there to begin negotiations. The Chinese position was characterized by three points, the first of which stated that “Tibet must accept that it is part of China.” A month later, having already missed a negotiation deadline and thereby prompting a Chinese incursion into Tibet, Lhasa finally responded to the delegation’s request for instructions, who were told: “Regarding Point One—that Tibet is part of China—If you have to accept this it is permissible if you are able to guarantee that the Dalai Lama’s name and authority will remain intact and the Tibetan Government will continue to function like it is now making decisions and acting independently.” However, two days later an emergency communiqué from Lhasa countermanded this initial instruction:

Regarding the reply to the Chinese Three Points, we have had meetings between the Regent and Kashag and also discussed this with the National Assembly and have communicated our decisions to you which we hope you have received. However, with regard to Point One regarding Tibet’s acceptance of being a part of China, the Dalai Lama ordered that a lottery divination should be done to determine whether this will cause any harm to Tibet in the future. Consequently, we did such a lottery-divination in Norbulinga in the chapel of Gombo where we invited both the deities Gombo and Lhamo together when we rolled the lottery. The lottery answered that if you accept that Tibet is a part of China then this will be harmful for Tibet. Therefore, we have to rely on this answer so do not accept any of the three Chinese points. However, you should all leave [Delhi] for Peking by the 26th of October.

The following month, the 16-year-old Dalai Lama assumed temporal power over Tibet, two years earlier than normal. About this, the Dalai Lama wrote:

The long years of Regency after the death of each Dalai Lama were an inevitable weakness in our system of government. During my own minority, there had been dissensions between separate factions in our government, and the administration of the country had deteriorated. We had reached a state in which most people were anxious to avoid responsibility, rather than accept it. Yet now, under the threat of invasion, we were more in need of unity than ever before, and I, as Dalai Lama, was the only person whom everybody in the country would unanimously follow. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 83)

Less than a year later, the young Dalai Lama sent a telegram to Mao Zedong officially confirming the Seventeen-Point Agreement, formally making Tibet part of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, it could be argued that being able to maintain the status quo of Tibet’s theocratic system was ultimately the deciding factor leading to the ratification of the agreement—freely handing over Tibet’s independence to China being a small price to pay as long as the Dalai Lama and the abbots could remain in their positions of power and influence (see Grunfeld, p. 110). This marks just the beginning of what A Great Deception refers to when, once the Dalai Lama had arrived in exile in India, he promised to lead his people back to a free and independent Tibet: “Basically, he needed to undo all that his lama policies had created!” (p. 159)

The following is how the Dalai Lama says in his 1962 and 1990 autobiographies that these events unfolded during those 12 months, interspersed with contradicting accounts quoted from Melvyn C. Goldstein’s A History of Modern Tibet (Vol 1., 1913-1951) and A. Tom Grunfeld’s The Making of Modern Tibet (rev. ed.):

Ngabo suggested that we had no alternative but to negotiate. If it was agreeable to the Tibetan Government, and if we would send some assistants, he proposed to go in person and try to open a dialogue with the Chinese in Peking. I contacted Lobsang Tashi and Lukhangwa in Lhasa to find out their opinion. They replied that they felt such negotiations should take place in Lhasa, but since the situation was desperate, they would have to agree to Peking as the venue. Because he had shown no hesitation in offering himself for the task, I concluded that Ngabo, whom I knew to be a very decisive administrator, should go to the Chinese capital. Accordingly, I sent two officials from Dromo and two from Lhasa to accompany him. I hoped that he could make it clear to the Chinese leadership that Tibet did not require ‘liberation’, just continued peaceful relations with our great neighbour. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, p. 62)

The only thing we could do was pursue our negotiations as best we could. We decided to give Ngabo the authority he had requested. One of the two officials he had sent to Lhasa took a message from myself and my Cabinet, in which we told Ngabo he should open negotiations on the firm condition that the Chinese armies would not advance any further into Tibet. We had understood that the negotiations would be held either in Lhasa or in Chamdo, where the Chinese armies were stationed, but the Chinese ambassador in India proposed that our delegation should go to Peking. I appointed four more officials as assistants to Ngabo, and they all arrived in Peking at the beginning of 1951. It was not until they returned to Lhasa, long afterwards, that we heard exactly what had happened to them. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 87)

The delegation was sent to Beijing because the Kashag had turned down the opportunity to negotiate in Lhasa, which the Chinese had originally agreed to. (Grunfeld, p. 113)

Before leaving for Yatung, the Kasgha appointed two officials, Sambo and Thubten Lengmon, to join Ngabo in Chamdo and assist him in negotiating with the Chinese. Sambo recalled: “… The Kashag also gave us a note to take to Ngabo that contained five points. It was not sealed but, rather, rolled up so we could read it. I looked at it and at once realized that according to it no peaceful negotiations were possible…. The points were more like answers [to previous Chinese Communist claims in broadcasts] than negotiating points and none of these was compromisable.” … Ngabo asked Sambo and Thubten Lengmon for the orders they had brought from the government and he took those to his room to read. After awhile Ngabo came rushing back to where Sambo was staying and said, “These five points are useless. Don’t you have any other verbal instructions?” When he heard that there were none, he said, “What are we supposed to do now? How do they expect us to negotiate with such points?” (Goldstein, pp. 743, 744, 745-746)

According to the report which they submitted then, the Chinese minister Chou En-lai had invited them all to a party when they arrived, and formally introduced them to the Chinese representatives. But as soon as the first meeting began, the chief Chinese representative produced a draft agreement containing ten articles ready-made. This was discussed for several days. Our delegation argued that Tibet was an independent state, and produced all the evidence to support their argument, but the Chinese would not accept it. Ultimately, the Chinese drafted a revised document, with seventeen articles. This was presented as an ultimatum. Our delegates were not allowed to make any alterations or suggestions. They were insulted and abused and threatened with personal violence, and with further military actions against the people of Tibet, and they were not allowed to refer to me or my government for further instructions. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 87)

Li Wi-han opened the meeting by saying that they were all there to discuss issues of great importance and should first decide on a procedure. He asked if Ngabo had prepared a position statement. When Ngabo replied that he had not, Li said that it would be better to start from a written agenda and asked if Ngabo would let him draw one up and present it on the following day. Ngabo agreed, and the meeting broke up. On the thirtieth, Li brought a statement containing the same ten points that the Chinese had broadcast and posted on the walls in Chamdo and Kham. It included such statements as “The people should return to the big motherland,” along with guarantees of religious freedom. The Chinese were very polite and asked the Tibetans to read it over carefully. Li said, “If you accept them all, that is good; but if not, we will reconsider and discuss them. And in any case, we can both add more points.” There was a long silence as the Tibetans read the points. When none of Tibetans ventured to speak, Li suggested that they adjourn. Thus ended the second day of negotiations. (Goldstein, p. 761)

This draft agreement was based on the assumption that Tibet was part of China. That was simply untrue, and it could not possibly have been accepted by our delegation without reference to me and my government, except under duress. But Ngabo had been a prisoner of the Chinese for a long time, and the other delegates were also virtual prisoners. At last, isolated from any advice, they yielded to compulsion and signed the document. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 88)

The delegation from Yatung brought a ten-point written statement that was the basis of the Tibetan position. They were instructed to use their judgement, but were to accept the status of Tibet as a part of China only in a token sense. They were instructed to establish a wireless link between Peking and Yatung so that other important issues could be discussed. They were clearly not authorized to make major decisions on their own. The Yatung delegation also brought Ngabo discouraging news about the status of outside assistance, including a report on a recent meeting with Nehru. They had been instructed to stop in Delhi and ask Nehru’s advice and help in the negotiations, and in particular to request him to pledge India’s participation in any Sino-Tibetan agreement as a guarantor. Ignoring this request, Nehru advised them to admit that Tibet was a part of China, since it was seen as such in the eyes of the world. He also told them they would probably have to agree to Chinese control over Tibet’s foreign relations, although he strongly urged them not to permit Chinese troops to be stationed in Tibet. With this in mind, Ngabo and the others examined the ten-point statement. They felt that although it was a major improvement over the five-point statement brought earlier from Lhasa, it was still unrealistic and would only poison the negotiating atmosphere. Ngabo suggested that certain points should be kept in mind during the upcoming talks, but that the statement should not be presented to the Chinese. Ngabo also believed that they should not refer important issues back to Yatung but should take responsibility upon themselves. He argued persuasively that the abbots and other conservatives in the assembly had no idea of the modern world and the Chinese Communists; they would refuse to accept the wording and terms the Chinese were going to present and would insist on talking about the patron-priest relationship and independence. He feared it would take weeks or months to make decisions if the National Assembly had to discuss each issue and that the Chinese would lose patience and renew their invasion of Tibet. However, if the negotiators assumed the responsibility, Ngabo said, an agreement could be reached quickly and in a spirit of friendship. He also pointed out that if the Dalai Lama and his government found this agreement unacceptable, they could later repudiate it on the grounds that the delegation did not have complete authority. As the leader of the delegation, Ngabo said, he would take full responsibility for this action and would accept any later punishment if the Tibetan government ultimately received outside assistance and decided to fight against the Chinese. The four other delegates agreed. (Goldstein, pp. 759-760)

The delegation in Beijing cabled the Kashag that it would be impossible to prevent Chinese troops from entering Lhasa. The Kashag replied that, in that case, they were authorized to agree to have the Tibetan army incorporated into the Chinese army and to allow the former to be in charge of defense. The delegation head, Ngabo, believed that now that the Kashag had changed its mind on the single item he was not originally authorized to negotiate, he no longer had to consult with them on every point. (Grunfeld, p. 113)

They still refused to affix the seals which were needed to validate it. But the Chinese forged duplicate Tibetan seals in Peking, and forced our delegation to seal the document with them. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 88)

What was most alarming, however, was that Ngabo had not been empowered to sign anything on my behalf, only to negotiate. I had kept the seals of state with me at Dromo to ensure that he could not. So he must have been coerced. But it was several more months before I heard the whole story. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, p. 64)

At the very beginning of the talks the Chinese had specifically asked Ngabo whether he had the authority to conclude and sign an agreement, and Ngabo told them he did. The Chinese then asked him whether he had the authority to write “with all the power and authority represented by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme.” Ngabo said that he did. Again, at the end of the discussions, the Chinese asked Ngabo whether he was ready to sign, and he replied that he was… After Ngabo and the others agreed to these seventeen points, the Chinese asked them whether they had brought seals to affix to the final document. Although Ngabo had the seal of the governor-general of Kham, he and the others said they had no seals. The Chinese therefore made new seals for each delegate that included only the delegate’s proper name. These were used in the final signing. (Goldstein, pp. 769-770)

When the negotiations ended, Ngabo told the Chinese he had the authority to sign but did not have his official seals. The Chinese asked if their duplicates would be acceptable, and the Tibetans agreed to that arrangement. (Grunfeld, p. 113)

Neither I nor my government were told that an agreement had been signed. We first came to know of it from a broadcast which Ngabo made on Peking Radio. It was a terrible shock when we heard the terms of it. We were appalled at the mixture of Communist clichés, vainglorious assertions which were completely false, and bold statements which were only partly true. And the terms were far worse and more oppressive than anything we had imagined. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, p. 88)

[A]ll we had to go on was the radio broadcast (repeated several times), together with a number of self-congratulatory sermons about the joys of Communism, the glory of Chairman Mao, the wonders of the People’s Republic of China and all the good things that the Tibetan people could look forward to now that our destinies were united. It was quite silly. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, p. 64)

In the Seventeen-Point Agreement Tibet acknowledged Chinese sovereignty for the first time in its history, yet the Tibetan delegation genuine felt they had done the best they could. If the Chinese adhered strictly to the terms of the new agreement, Tibet would continue to have the freedom to preserve its own religion and culture; the Dalai Lama and other officials would continue in office; and the system of government would be maintained… But since Ngabo did not have the authority to sign the agreement on behalf of Tibet, all China’s gains depended on the reactions of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. The Chinese could insure that Ngabo remained on Chinese and Tibetan territory, but they could not control the course of action of the Dalai Lama and his government. (Goldstein, p. 772)

Soon after the agreement was signed, our delegation sent a telegram to tell me that the Chinese government had appointed a general called Chang Chin-wu as their representative in Lhasa. He was coming via India, instead of the long overland route through eastern Tibet. Yatung, where I was staying, was just inside the Tibetan border on the main route from India to Lhasa, and so it was clear that I would have to meet him as soon as he set foot in our country. (Dalai Lama, p. 89)

The Dalai Lama told Chang that he would reply regarding acceptance of the Seventeen-Point Agreement after he returned to Lhasa and had consulted the abbots of the monasteries and other officials… On 20 July the Dalai Lama sent a telegram to Mao through the Minority Nationalities Commission in Peking that expressed his welcome to Chang Ching-wu and said that the Tibetan National Assembly would be convened to discuss the Seventeen-Point Agreement after they returned to Lhasa and after Ngabo arrived with the original copy of the agreement. (Goldstein, p. 801)

The five Tibetan signatories to the Seventeen-Point Agreement, led by Ngabo, were present [when the National Assembly was convened] but were seated separately from the main body of delegates. Ngabo gave a detailed and rather impassioned speech to the assembly that took over an hour. He ended his comments: “If you feel that this Seventeen-Point Agreement will help the joint secular and religious form of government and the activities of the Dalai Lama, then accept it and put it into practice. But if you think it is wrong, then you can punish me, saying that we have ignored the inner instructions. For the five of us [the delegates] whatever you want to take, our body, life, property, whatever you have to do, go ahead and do it and we will have no regrets.” He then said it would be easier for those in the assembly to discuss the matter if he and the other delegates were not there, and the five delegates left the assembly hall. After a lengthy discussion in which the majority argued that the Seventeen-Point Agreement promised that Tibet could maintain its religious government and monastic system together with the estate systems on which it was based, the assembly recommended to the Dalai Lama that the agreement be approved. (Goldstein, p. 812)