[The following is what the Dalai Lama says in his 1962 and 1990 autobiographies to explain the correspondence between himself and General Tan in the days leading up to his self-exile. General Tan was the acting representative of the Central People’s Government in Tibet and the political commissar of the Tibet Military Area Command. This is then followed by some analysis of relevant points from A. Tom Grunfeld’s The Making of Modern Tibet. My own comments appear italicized in brackets.]
The general’s letters to me were written in friendly terms which would have seemed more sincere if I had not already been told of his rage by my ministers. He said he was concerned for my safety and invited me to take refuge in his camp.
I replied to all his letters to gain time—time for anger to cool on both sides, and time for me to urge moderation of the Lhasan people. And to this end I thought it would be foolish to argue with the general, or to point out that Chinese protection from my own people was the very last thing I needed. On the contrary, I decided to reply in a way which I hoped would calm him down. And this I could only do by seeming to accept his sympathy and welcome his advice. In my first letter I told him how embarrassed I had been at my people’s action in preventing me from coming to his entertainment. In the second letter, I told him I had given orders that the people surrounding the Norbulingka should disperse, and I concurred with his point of view that these people, under the pretext of protecting me, were only working to undermine the relations between the Chinese and our government. And in the third letter, I also added that I must separate the people who supported new ideas and those who opposed them before I could visit his headquarters.
Even if I had thought at the time that these letters would be quoted against me later, I would still have written them, because my most urgent moral duty at that moment was to prevent a totally disastrous clash between my unarmed people and the Chinese army.
And perhaps I may repeat once more that I could not approve of violence, and so I could not approve of the violent attitude the people of Lhasa were showing. I could and do appreciate the affection for me, as the symbol of Tibet, an attitude which was the immediate cause of the anger they were showing against the Chinese on that fateful day. I could not blame them for the anxiety for my safety, because the Dalai Lama represented most of what they lived and worked for. But I was certain that what they were doing could only lead to disaster if they continued, and as Head of State I had to try by every means to curb their feelings and stop them bringing about their own destruction under the weight of the Chinese army. So the advice I gave them was given with the fullest sincerity, and although my letters to the Chinese general were written to disguise my true intentions, I felt and still feel that they were justified. (Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, pp. 186-188)
Tuesday, March 10th, 1959
General Tan’s first letter to the Dalai Lama:
Respected Dalai Lama:
It is very good indeed that you wanted to come to the Military Area Command [for the theatrical performance]. You are heartily welcome. Since you have been put into very great difficulties due to the intrigues and provocations of the reactionaries, it may be advisable that you do not come for the time being.
Salutations and best regards,
Tan Kuan-san
A letter arrived from General Tan Kuan-sen suggesting, in suspiciously moderate tones, that I move to his headquarters for my own safety. I was amazed at his effrontery. There was no question of doing any such thing. However, in order to buy time, I wrote him a conciliatory reply. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, p. 134)
[I read no effrontery in the general’s letter; rather, as indicated in the Dalai Lama’s reply below, the general seemed rather undisturbed by the incident and was willing to wait it out. Also, there was no suggestion at this point that the Dalai Lama move to the PLA headquarters.]
Wednesday, March 11th, 1959
The Dalai Lama’s reponse to General Tan’s first letter:
Dear Comrade, Political Commissar Tan:
I decided to go to the Military Area Command to see the theatrical performance yesterday, but I was unable to do so, owing to obstruction by the people, both religious and secular, who were instigated by a few evil elements and who did not know the facts.
This has put me to indescribable shame. I am greatly upset and worried and at a loss as to what to do. When I received your letter (this refers to the letter sent by General Tan Kuan-san to the Dalai Lama on the 10th), I was immediately overjoyed because you were not disturbed by the trouble.
Reactionary, evil elements are carrying out activities endangering me under the pretext of protecting my safety. I am taking measures to calm things clown. In a few days when the situation becomes stable, l will certainly meet you. If you have any internal directives for me, please tell me frankly through this messenger (this refers to Ngapo Ngawang Jigme).
Dalai Lama
written by my own hand
[Indeed, rather than “buying time,” the Dalai Lama’s reply above actually adds fuel to the fire, saying that the rebels’ shameless activities are greatly upsetting him, even endangering his life!]
General Tan’s second letter to the Dalai Lama:
The reactionaries are now audacious enough to have openly and arrogantly carried out military provocations. They have erected fortifications and set up a large number of machine guns and armed reactionaries along the national defence highway (the high way north of Norbulinka), thereby seriously disrupting the security of the national defence communications.
Many times in the past, we have told Kasha [the governing council of Tibet] that the People’s Liberation Army is duty-bound to defend the country and to protect the security of communication lines related to national defence, and therefore it certainly cannot remain indifferent to this serious act of military provocation.
Therefore, the Tibet Military Area Command has sent letters to Surkong, Neusha, Shasu and Pala asking them to tell the reactionaries to remove all the fortifications they have established and withdraw from the highway immediately.
Otherwise, they themselves will have to bear the responsibility for all the serious consequences. I want to inform you of this. Please let me know what your views are at your earliest convenience.
Salutations and best regards,
Tan Kuan-san
In his other letter, the General ordered the ministers to instruct the crowd to take down the barricades that had been erected on the road outside Lhasa that led to China. Unfortunately, this had a calamitous effect. It seemed to the crowd leaders that, by saying they wanted these removed, the Chinese were making a clear indication that they planned to bring in reinforcements which would be used to attack the Dalai Lama. They refused.
On hearing this, I decided that I must speak to these men myself. I did so, explaining that there was a serious danger that Chinese troops would use force to dispel the crowd if people did not leave very soon. Evidently my entreaty was partially successful, as afterward they announced that they would move to Shol, the village at the foot of the Potala, where many angry demonstrations were subsequently held. But the majority of the people outside the Norbulingka remained.
It was at this point that I consulted the Nechung oracle, which was hurriedly summoned. Should I stay or should I try to escape? What was I to do? The oracle made it clear that I should stay and keep open the dialogue with the Chinese. For once, I was unsure of whether this really was the best course of action. I was reminded of Lukhangwa’s remark about the gods lying when they too become desperate. So I spent the afternoon performing Mo, another form of divination. The result was identical. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, pp. 134-135)
Thursday, March 12th, 1959
The Dalai Lama’s response to General Tan’s second letter:
Dear Comrade, Political Commissar Tan:
I suppose you have received my letter of yesterday (referring to March 11) forwarded to you by Ngapo. I have received the letter you sent me this morning. The unlawful actions of the reactionary clique break my heart. Yesterday I told Kasha to order the immediate dissolution of the illegal people’s conference and the immediate withdrawal of the reactionaries who arrogantly moved into Lo-pu-lin-k’a [Norbulinka] under the pretext of protecting me.
As to the incidents of yesterday and the day before, which were created under the pretext of protecting my safety, and have seriously estranged relations between the Central Government and the Local Government, I am making every possible effort to deal with them. At 8:30 Peking time this morning a few Tibetan army men suddenly fired several shots near the Tsinghai-Tibet Highway. Fortunately no serious disturbances occurred.
As to the questions mentioned in your letter (referring to the letter of the 11th sent by General Tan Kuan-san to the Dalai Lama), I am planning to persuade my few subordinates and give them instructions. Please tell me frankly any instructions you have for me.
Dalai
Sunday, March 15th, 1959
General Tan’s third letter to the Dalai Lama:
Respected Dalai Lama:
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your two letters dated March 11 and March 12. The traitorous activities of the reactionary clique of the upper strata in Tibet have grown into intolerable proportions. These individuals, in collusion with foreigners, have engaged in reactionary, traitorous activities for quite some time. The Central People’s Government has long adopted an attitude of magnanimity and enjoined the Local Government of Tibet to deal with them seriously, but the Local Government of Tibet has all along adopted an attitude of feigning compliance while actually helping them with their activities, with the result that things have now come to such a grave impasse.
The Central People’s Government still hopes that the Local Government of Tibet will change its erroneous attitude and immediately assume responsibility for putting down the rebellion and mete out severe punishment to the traitors; Otherwise the Central People’s Government will have to act itself to safeguard the solidarity and unification of the motherland.
In your letter, you said; “As to the incidents which were created under the pretext of protecting my safety and have seriously estranged relations between the Central Government and the Local Government, I am making every possible effort to deal with them.”
We warmly welcome this correct attitude on your part. We are very much concerned about your present position and safety. If you think it necessary and possible to extricate yourself from the present dangerous position of being abducted by the traitors, we cordially welcome you and your entourage to come and stay for a brief period in the Military Area Command. We are willing to assume full responsibility for your safety. As to what is the best course to follow, this is entirely up to you to decide.
In addition, l have much pleasure in informing you that the second National People’s Congress has decided to open its first session on April 17.
Salutations and my best regards,
Tan Kuan-san
Monday, March 16th, 1959
The next days passed in a dizzying, frightening blur. I began to receive reports of Chinese military build-up and the mood of the crowd grew almost hysterical. I consulted the oracle a second time, but his advice was the same as before. Then, on the 16th, I received a third and final letter from the General, together with an enclosure from Ngabo. General Tan’s letter was much along the lines of his last two. Ngabo’s, on the other hand, made clear what I and everyone else had dimly concluded, namely that the Chinese were planning to attack the crowd and shell the Norbulingka. He wanted me to indicate on a map where I would be—so that the artillerymen could be briefed to aim off whichever building I marked. It was a horrifying moment as the truth sank in. Not only was my own life in danger, but the lives of thousands upon thousands of my people now seemed certain to be lost. If only they could be persuaded to go away, to return to their homes. Surely they could see that they had demonstrated to the Chinese the strength of their feelings? But it was no use. They were in such a pitch of fury against these unwelcome foreigners with their brutal methods that nothing could move them. They would stay till the end and die keeping guard over their Precious Protector.
Reluctantly, I set about replying to Ngabo and General Tan, saying something along the lines that I was dismayed by the disgraceful behaviour of reactionary elements amongst the population of Lhasa. I assured them that I still thought it a good idea that I should move to the sanctuary of the Chinese headquarters, but that it was very difficult just at the moment; and that I hoped they too would have the patience to sit out the disturbances. Anything to buy time! After all, the crowd could not stay put indefinitely. I took care not to say where I was in the hope that this lack of knowledge would cause uncertainty and delay. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, pp. 135-136)
The Dalai Lama’s response to General Tan’s third letter:
Dear Comrade, Political Commissar Tan:
Your letter dated the 15th has just been received at three o’ clock. I am very glad that you are so concerned about my safety and hereby express my thanks.
The day before yesterday, the fifth day of the second month according to the Tibetan Calendar (March 14, 1959) I made a speech to more than 70 representatives of the government officials instructing them from various aspects, calling on them to consider seriously present and long-term interests and to calm down, or my life would be in danger.
After these severe reproaches the conditions took a light turn for the better. Though the conditions here and outside are still very difficult to deal with at present, I am trying skillfully to make a demarcation line between the progressive people and those opposing the revolution among the government officials.
A few days from now, when there are enough forces that I can trust, I shall make my way to the Military Area Command secretly. When that time comes, I shall first send you a letter. I request you to adopt reliable measures. What are your views? Please write often.
Dalai
Tuesday, March 17th, 1959
Having dispatched my replies, I was at a loss as to what to do next. The following day, I again sought the counsel of the oracle. To my astonishment, he shouted, ‘Go! Go! Tonight!’ The medium, still in his trance, then staggered forward and, snatching up some paper and a pen, wrote down, quite clearly and explicitly, the route that I should take out of the Norbulingka, down to the last Tibetan town on the Indian border. His directions were not what might have been expected. That done, the medium, and young monk named Lobsang Jigme*, collapsed in a faint, signifying that Dorje Drakden had left his body. Just then, as if to reinforce the oracle’s instructions, two mortar shells exploded in the marsh outside the northern gate of the Jewel Park.
Looking back on this event at a distance of more than thirty-one years, I am certain that Dorje Drakden had known all along that I must leave Lhasa on the 17th, but he did not say so for fear of word getting out. If no plans were made, nobody would find out about them.
I did not begin preparations for my escape immediately, however. First I wanted to confirm the oracle’s decision, which I did by performing Mo [divination] once more. The answer agreed with the oracle, even though the odds against making a successful break seemed terrifyingly high. Not only was the crowd refusing to let anyone into or out of the palace grounds without first searching and interrogating them, but also Ngabo’s letter made it clear that the Chinese had already considered the possibility that I might try to escape. They must have taken precautions. Yet the supernatural counsels fitted in with my own reasoning: I was convinced that leaving was the only thing I could do to make the crowd disperse. If I was no longer inside, there could be no reason for people to remain. I therefore decided to accept the advice. (Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, p. 136)
[* In the book In Exile from the Land of Snows (pp. 216-217), it is reported that Lobsang Jimge, the medium for the Nechung spirit, did not know about the Dalai Lama’s escape from Lhasa until Friday, March 20th.]
Analysis from The Making of Modern Tibet:
- China concedes that the theatrical performance was set for 10 March, but emphatically denies that the Dalai Lama was coerced in any way to set that date. Beijing has maintained, in fact, that it was the Dalai Lama who set the date and, indeed, had done so one month earlier. For years this claim was roundly ridiculed as “communist lies and propaganda” until Dawa Norbu publically acknowledged that a former Tibetan official had confided in him that the Chinese account was correct. When confronted with this contradiction in 1981 the Dalai Lama admitted that his original story was incorrect, agreeing that he had selected the date several weeks prior to the event. (Grunfeld, rev. ed., p. 137)
- On the seventeenth [of March] some Tibetan Cabinet ministers sent a letter to Ngabo, requesting his aid in helping to move the Dalai Lama to the PLA camp. Ngabo acknowledged receipt of the letter and promised assistance. Then, suddenly, at 4:00 P.M., the Dalai Lama claims to have heard two mortar shells fired from the direction of the military camp, only to splash harmlessly into a marsh in the palace compound. A state of near panic ensued, since it was assumed—although never verified—that the Chinese, finally having come to the end of their patience, had decided to attack. The Dalai Lama recalled that at this point the hasty decision was made that he would have to flee. (Grunfeld, p. 136)
- On 2 March 1959—only days before the revolt broke out in Lhasa—the Calcutta paper the Statesman published a remarkable article by an unnamed author [Our Special Correspondent, “The Pattern of Revolt in Tibet,” The Statesman, 2 March 1959, p. 6. See Requiem for Tibet, pp. 164-175]. This author, proving to have exceptional sources and insight, uncannily predicted the possible course of events in Tibet in coming days. He wrote that the Khampas and refugees, alike, in Lhasa would agree that the Chinese soldiers presented little threat to the Tibetans in the holy city. In spite of this, the rebels would begin cutting off all the roads leading into the city in the event that fighting broke out. Moreover, the author surmised, the Dalai Lama would be unwilling to leave Lhasa; in order to convince him to leave, the Khampas would have to create some disturbance. (Grunfled, pp. 142-143)
- From the very beginning, the Dalai Lama’s private and public communication with Han officials remained friendly and supportive… The Dalai Lama has never repudiated the fact that he was on friendly terms with the Han for almost a decade, but now argues that his conciliatory attitudes were solely meant to avoid an outbreak of violence, playing for time in the hope that moderate solutions could be found. China cannot be blamed for thinking this explanation too convenient and too much the beneficiary of hindsight. Can Chinese officials be blamed for believing the Dalai Lama was forced to leave Tibet against his will, or that the Tezpur statement was not his own? All the evidence supported those points of view. The disbelief with which China’s version of events was received in the West only reinforced China’s xenophobia and distrust of the world’s media. (Grunfeld, pp. 141-142)
- While the notion that the Dalai Lama had been abducted was considered unworthy of serious attention [by the Western and Indian press corps], so were the Dalai-Tan letters. Both Nehru and Time assured their respective audiences that the letters could not be anything but the cleverest of forgeries. This rush to judgement caused considerable embarrasment when China published photocopies of the letters, half of them in the Dalai Lama’s handwriting, whereupon the cleric was obliged to verify their authenticity. (Grunfeld, p. 144)
- The most telling example of the lack of objectivity on the part of the [Legal Inquiry Committee (LIC) established by the CIA-funded International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)] is its treatment of sterilizations. The LIC quotes the Dalai Lama as stating that sterilization began in 1957 and was carried out on a “large scale”; “two or three villages were completely sterilized.” The Tibetan leader went on to claim that “the Communist Chinese adopted these measures under the pretext of preventing certain epidemic diseases. They administered certain injections to men and women in order to make them impotent. They also forced upon them treatments to make the male and female reproductive organs functionless.” In this instance the committee made its charge on the basis of a single complaint: “expert medical evidence on the details given is that the treatment described is not in accordance with any known method of sterilization. Searching clinical investigations of Tibetans who claimed to have been sterilized produced no proof that this had been done.” The Dalai Lama’s promises to produce evidence to back up these charges never materialized. That did not prevent widespread publicity, as though the allegation had been irrefutably documented. In the years following the publication of the LIC’s report, the Dalai Lama, Trikamdas, and the ICJ all claimed to have found proof of sterilization; yet they failed to produce a single person who could be clinically examined to verify these claims. One must keep in mind that impotency is a frequent consequence of the ravages of venereal disease, which was rampant throughout Tibet. (Grunfeld, pp. 148-149)
- In trying to sum up the events of the 1950s, the emerging evidence tends to substantiate China’s view of events. The Dalai Lama’s oft-stated view that China’s “colonial” rule was so oppressive and murderous that the Tibetan people felt compelled to rise in one mighty swoop to cut their chains was not quite accurate. However, neither was China’s claims of absolute benevolence, harmony, and freedom from feudal oppression (“a joyous liberation was stirring the ends of the land”). Perhaps it can be said that when events were depicted for public consumption, China appears to have fabricated the least. (Grunfeld, p. 149)
